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Abstract
Abel (2002) shows that pessimism and doubt in the subjective distribution of the
growth rate of consumption reduce the riskfree rate puzzle and the equity premium
puzzle. We quantify the amount of pessimism and doubt in survey data on US con-
sumption and income. Individual forecasters are in fact pessimistic, but show marked
overconﬁdence rather than doubt. Whether this implies that overconﬁdence should
be built into Abel’s model depends on how the empirically heterogeneous subjec-
tive distributions are mapped into the distribution of a ﬁctitious representative agent.
We work out the form of this mapping in an Arrow-Debreu economy and show that
the equity premium increases with the dispersion of beliefs. We then estimate this
aggregate distribution and ﬁnd little evidence of either overconﬁdence or doubt.
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11 Introduction
A number of recent papers on the riskfree rate and equity premium puzzles explore depar-
tures from the neoclassical paradigm in which the puzzle was originally formulated. For
example, Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) adopt a non-standard utility function, moti-
vated by prospect theory; Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (2000) and Tornell (2000) relax
the rational expectation hypothesis, postulating ambiguity-averse agents; and Benartzi
and Thaler (1995) consider myopic loss aversion. While several theoretical explanations
have been proposed, empirical attempts at discriminating the more successful models are
lagging behind. This paper is one such attempt.
We concentrate on the work of Abel (2002), who studies two deviations from rational
expectations in an otherwise standard neoclassical framework. Starting from the Lucas
(1978) fruit-tree asset pricing model, he shows that uniform pessimism and doubt enhance
the empirical performance of the model, in particular by reducing the equity premium and
riskfree rate puzzles. Uniform pessimism is deﬁned as (the subjective distribution being)
a leftward translation of the objective distribution, doubt as a mean-preserving spread of
the objective distribution.
Given the crucial role played by the behavioral assumptions, an evaluation of their
empirical plausibility is desirable. In Abel’s words “...this demonstration leads naturally
to the next question: How much pessimism and doubt might characterize subjective dis-
tributions?” (page 1088). In this paper we take on the question. We commence our
investigation with no strong prior on the presence of pessimism in actual expectations. As
for doubt, surveys and experimental studies typically conclude that people are prone to
overconﬁdence, that is, its opposite.1 Using methods discussed in Giordani and S¨ oderlind
(2003), we study data from the Livingston Survey and, in particular, from the Survey of
Professional Forecasters, looking for evidence for and against pessimism and doubt in the
subjective distributions of US consumption and real output growth.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 summarizes the model in Abel (2002);
Section 3 describes the survey data; Section 4 looks at pessimism; Section 5 is concerned
with doubt in individual distributions; Section 6 develops a simple model to argue that
1Rabin (1998) and Hirshleifer (2001) discuss overconﬁdence in their surveys of behavioral economics
and ﬁnance. In this literature, the term “overconﬁdence” usually describes overly narrow conﬁdence bands
(the opposite of Abel’s doubt), but it can also stand for inadequate adjustment of one’s forecast when given
knowledge of other agents’ forecasts.
2when the focus is on asset pricing it may be more appropriate to look for doubt in the
average (across forecasters) distribution; and Section 7 summarizes our ﬁndings.
2 A Short Recap of Abel’s Model
This section presents a simpliﬁed version of the model in Abel (2002). It shows the risk
premium on a consumption claim when the representative investor has pessimism and
doubt.
Under the assumption of lognormality of both the objective and subjective distribu-
tions, Abel shows that pessimism and doubt enter linearly in the determination of the
riskfree rate and of the equity premium. The same assumption also implies that uniform
pessimism and doubt reduce to a comparison between the means and variances of the two
distributions, which is also the approach taken here.
With a constant relative risk aversion γ, the price of a one-period asset that gives the
payoff Dt+1 in the next period is PDt = β E∗
t (Ct+1/Ct)−γ Dt+1, where β is the discount
factor, and E∗
t is the expectation according to the representative investor’s subjective be-
liefs. This result comes directly from the ﬁrst order condition for optimal investment in
any standard model (for instance, the Lucas (1978) model).
Assume that the subjective beliefs of the investor are that ln(Ct+1/Ct) is normally
distributed with mean µ∗ and variance σ∗2. It is then straightforward to calculate the
prices of a one-period consumption claim (Dt+1 = Ct+1) and a one-period real bond
(Dt+1 = 1). See Appendix A for details.
In a large sample, the average return coincides with the (true) expected value of
Dt+1/PDt, that is, E(Dt+1/PDt), where the price is determined by the subjective be-
liefs (as described above). Assume that the true distribution of consumption growth is
normal, but with variance σ2 = σ∗2 − θ and mean µ = µ∗ + 1 + θ/2. If θ and 1
are positive, then the true distribution has a smaller variance (investors have doubt) and
a higher mean (investors are pessimistic). Deﬁne the excess return as the return on the
consumption claim (Rct) divided by the return on the real bond (Rrt). Straightforward
calculations (see Appendix A) give the log expected excess return as
lnE(Rct/Rrt) = γσ2 + 1 + γθ, (1)
where γ is the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion. The ﬁrst term on the right hand side
3is the risk premium under rational expectations, the second term shows that pessimism
(1 > 0) generates higher average excess returns, and the third term shows that doubt
(θ > 0) does the same. The doubt term is potentially more promising since it is multiplied
by the risk aversion coefﬁcient, which is often believed to be substantially higher than
unity. The rest of this paper is an attempt to measure the degree of doubt and pessimism
directly.
3 Data
This section describes the survey data we use and how it relates to Abel’s model.
In the Lucas (1978) fruit-tree model, consumption, income, and dividends are the
same. As Abel notices, this poses a problem at the stage of calibration and testing. Con-
sumption and income exhibit similar behaviors in the US. Dividends stand apart, however,
having decreased in real terms in a century of data (see page 1088 in Abel), and having
exhibited more volatile growth rates than consumption and output.
We follow the standard approach in analyzing the consumption-based asset pricing
model by considering consumption and income. They are equivalent in fruit-tree model of
Lucas, butitistheconsumptionpaththatismostrelevantforassetpricesinamoregeneral
framework (see Section 2). However, survey data on complete subjective distributions (as
opposed to point forecasts) is only available for income. We therefore study doubt on
real GDP forecasts. The high correlation in both actual and expected growth rates of
consumption and income (which we document in Section 4) gives us some conﬁdence
that statements concerning doubt made for income may apply to consumption as well.
We base most of our analysis on survey data from the Survey of Professional Fore-
casters (SPF), which provides forecasts of both real consumption (real consumption ex-
penditures) and the growth rate of real GDP2, both available from 1981Q3. The SPF is
a quarterly survey of key economic variables. The participants are professional forecast-
ers from the business and ﬁnancial community, and are screened prior to inclusion in the
survey. Forecasters can be identiﬁed by a number, but are otherwise anonymous, which
lessens the suspect that forecasters have incentives to misreport.3
2The SPF data refers to real GNP from 1981Q3 to 1991Q4, and to real GDP since 1992Q1. For our
purposes the difference can be disregarded.
3Studies of stock analysts’ forecasts ﬁnd a large dose of optimism in forecasting earnings (Chan,
Karceski, and Lakonishok (2003)). However, these analysts have an incentive to release optimistic fore-
4The growth rates of real GDP and consumption are deﬁned (in the SPF) as the value
in year t divided by the value in year t − 1, minus one. We use forecasts of this growth
rate at four forecasting horizons: one to four quarters ahead. In practice, the four quarters
ahead forecast is made in Q1 of year t, the three quarters ahead forecast is made in Q2
and so forth.
A unique feature of the SPF is that, for a handful of variables, which include real
GDP growth (but not consumption), forecasters provide a histogram of their subjective
probabilitydistribution. Thehistogrambinsaresetbythesurveymanager, andforecasters
decide on the amount of probability mass assigned to each bin. Before 1992, the bins
boundaries were -2, 0, 2, 4, 6. Since 1992, they have been -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.
The Livingston survey summarizes the forecasts of economists from industry, govern-
ment, banking, and academia. It is the oldest continuous survey of economists’ forecasts.4
It provides point forecasts for real GDP, but not for consumption. Since the Livingston
survey only supplies point forecasts, it is not helpful to discuss doubt. We use it in addi-
tion to the SPF to evaluate evidence of pessimism. In particular, we wish to check whether
the two surveys give quantitatively similar answers with regard to pessimism during the
same period. Moreover, because the Livingston series on real GDP is longer (starting in
1972), we can ask whether the degree of pessimism is sensitive to the sample.
4 Pessimism (too low expected growth rate)
This section studies whether US forecasters have been pessimists historically, in the sense
that they have consistently underestimated the growth rates of real GDP and consumption.
We compare the forecast errors using the median (across forecasters) point forecast.5
The results, summarized in Table 1, show evidence of pessimism. The SPF forecast
of GDP growth is lower than the mean of the actual series at all four horizons, with the
bias increasing with the horizon. At the four-quarter horizon, output growth was on av-
erage 0.64% higher than forecasted (the average is 2.31%). Over the same period, the
casts, as testiﬁed by recent events.
4Both the SPF and the Livingston survey are now administered by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadel-
phia. The Livingston forecasts refer to the level at a one year horizon, and are released semiannually.
5This is common practice in studies of survey forecasts, since the median is less sensitive to outliers. For
consistency with the rest of the paper, we use the means of the ﬁtted normal distribution as point forecasts
(see Section 5). Forecasters in the SPF also provide a point forecast (besides the histogram). Results using
these original point forecasts are nearly identical.
54 quarters 3 quarters 2 quarters 1 quarter
SPF, GDP, 82-02 0.64 (0.26) 0.38 (0.21) 0.31 (0.18) 0.26 (0.17)
SPF, consumption, 82-02 0.72 (0.11) 0.35 (0.09) 0.08 (0.07) 0.04 (0.04)
Livingston, GDP, 82-02 0.67 (0.35)
Livingston, GDP, 72-02 0.20 (0.37)
Table 1: Average forecast error of the growth rates of real GDP and real consumption. The
forecast error is deﬁned as outcome minus median forecast. Standard deviations (in parenthesis)
assume MA(1) errors, and a Newey-West estimator has been used. SPF forecasts made in 1985Q1
and 1986Q1 are excluded.
Livingston median forecast underestimates growth by 0.67%. One would suspect that the
strong growth in the 1990s contributes strongly to the amount of ex-post pessimism. In
fact, using the full sample from the Livingston survey (1972-2002), the average underes-
timation falls to 0.20%.
The forecasts of consumption growth tell a similar story: the average underestima-
tion (sample 1982-2002) is 0.72% for the four-quarter horizon. The forecast errors of
consumption and GDP have a correlation of 0.71.
This evidence suggests that US forecasters have been pessimistic. For the 1982–2002
sample, this pessimism would have contributed around 0.7% to the average excess return
in (1), that is, 1 = 0.007. While this is not a trivial amount, it does not cover much
ground in improving the empirical performance of the model: Abel’s Table 1 shows that,
in the absence of doubt, 1 needs to be at least ﬁve times higher to account for the eq-
uity premium—unless the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion takes (what are commonly
thought to be) unreasonable values.
5 Doubt (too high variance of the subjective distribution)
This section studies whether US forecasters have had doubt historically, that is, if they
have overestimated the uncertainty of consumption growth rates. We check if subjective
conﬁdence bands actually cover the correct number of actual outcomes.
In order to derive conﬁdence intervals from the histograms for GDP growth in the
SPF, we estimate the density functions in two different ways: (i) using the histogram data
directly—combined with the assumption that the distribution is uniform within each bin;
(ii) ﬁtting a normal distribution to the histogram data.
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Figure 1: Example of an individual histogram. Subﬁgure a shows the histogram of GDP growth
2001, as reported by a typical forecaster in 2001Q1. The ﬁtted normal distribution is also shown.
Subﬁgure b shows the distribution function calculated assuming a uniform distribution within each
bin, and the ﬁtted normal distribution. The actual GDP growth is also marked.
Figure 1 illustrates the estimation methods. Subﬁgure a shows the histogram (for
GDP growth 2001) reported by a typical forecaster in 2001Q1—typical because he/she
reported non-zero probabilities for ﬁve intervals, and because he/she was much too opti-
mistic that particular year. To calculate conﬁdence bands from the histograms we assume
that the distribution is uniform within each interval. While this is a convenient assump-
tion, it squares poorly with the overall shape of most histograms in the data set: they
often look bell-shaped. As a consequence, the assumption may make the distributions
look wider than they really are. To capture that feature, we also provide results from
normal distributions ﬁtted to the histograms—which is also illustrated in the ﬁgure.
The moments of the ﬁtted normal distribution are estimated by minimizing the sum
of the squared differences between the survey probabilities and the probabilities implied
by a normal distribution.6 For comparison with Abel’s model, we transform all data to
natural logarithms.
Subﬁgure b shows the corresponding cumulative distribution functions. They look
fairly similar for this (and most) observation. The actual outcome (0.25% GDP growth)
is far out in the left tail (the 1.8 percentile according to the ﬁtted normal and the 2.5
6A more detailed description of the data and of the nonlinear least squared estimation procedure can be
found in Giordani and S¨ oderlind (2003).
7percentile according to the histogram). However, had the outcome been 3.5% instead,

























































d. Error of fitted N(µ,σ
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Figure 2: Average probabilities in survey and ﬁtted normal distributions. Subﬁgures a and b
show the average (across forecasters) probabilities of GDP growth according to SPF in quarter 1.
Subﬁgures c and d show the difference between the actual probability mass contained in each bin
and the corresponding probability implied by the ﬁtted normal distribution.
The main drawback with the ﬁtted normal distribution is that it does not work well
on the few histograms that look very different from a bell shape. Overall, this is not
a big problem—as can be gauged from the average (across forecasters) histograms in
Figure 2. Subﬁgures a–b show the average (across forecasters) histogram for the ﬁrst
quarter of each year, and subﬁgures c–d show the difference between the actual proba-
8bility mass contained in each bin and the corresponding probability implied by the ﬁtted
normal distribution. The differences are small, which suggests that the distributions are
approximately normal. However, we report all results for both assumptions (normal and
uniform-within-bin).
Having estimated the mean and variance for each forecaster (and each quarter), we
can keep track of how often the realized outcome (the actual GDP growth) falls within a
given conﬁdence band (90%, 80%, or 66%). We will then say that there is doubt (over-
conﬁdence) if the actual GDP growth is inside the 90% (say) conﬁdence band more (less)
than 90% of the time. Since the number of forecasters has changed from quarter to quar-
ter, we normalize the number to one, so each period receives the same weight in the time
average.
The results are summarized in Table 2. We discard data for 1985Q1 and 1986Q1
since the survey probably had serious errors in those quarters (see Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia (2000)). There is a strong consistency in coverage ratios at all forecast
horizons, so we show results for all horizons jointly.
Fitted normal Histograms, assuming
distributions ﬂat pdf within bin
Conﬁdence level: 90% 80% 66% 90% 80% 66%
No bias adjustment 0.58 0.48 0.38 0.71 0.60 0.49
Common bias adjustment 0.63 0.55 0.44 0.77 0.68 0.59
Individual bias adjustment 0.68 0.59 0.49 0.81 0.73 0.63
Table 2: Comparison of conﬁdence bands and actual GDP growth, individual distributions.
This table shows the fraction of forecasts when actual GDP growth is inside the respective x%
conﬁdence band. Conﬁdence bands are from the individual distributions. The number of forecast-
ers is normalized to one in each quarter. In the common adjustment, the bands of all forecasters
are adjusted by the same amount (different values for Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4). In the individual
adjustment, the band of a forecaster is adjusted by his/her own average bias (different values for
Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4). The sample is 1982Q1–2002Q4, excluding 1985Q1 and 1986Q1.
The main result is that forecasters underestimate uncertainty. This remains true also
after adjusting the point forecasts (the mid points of the conﬁdence bands) for the bias
in the mean growth rate. Two different adjustments are used. First, in the “common”
adjustment the conﬁdence bands of all forecasters are shifted up by the same amount,
which in practice means 0.64% for all Q1 forecasts, 0.38% for all Q2 forecasts and so
forth (see Table 1). Second, in the “individual” adjustment, each forecaster is adjusted by
9his own bias.
It is clear from Table 2 that there is more overconﬁdence according to the ﬁtted normal
distributions than according to the uniform-within-bin. The difference is explained by
how the two methods deal with the distribution within an interval: whereas our application
of the histogram data assumes that the density function is ﬂat within each interval, the
ﬁtted normal distributions put relatively more probability mass close to the center. This
means that the ﬁtted normal distributions effectively have less fat tails. For instance, with
the individual bias adjustment, the 90% conﬁdence bands cover 68% of the outcomes
assuming a normal distribution, and 81% assuming a uniform-within-bin distribution.
Although we tend to believe that the truth is somewhere in between, both approaches
indicate overconﬁdence rather than doubt.
To test these ﬁndings statistically we apply the Christoffersen (1998) test. It tests
for correct coverage by checking if an x% conﬁdence band indeed covers x% of the
outcomes. Underthenullhypothesisandtheadditionalassumptionthattheforecasterrors
are serially uncorrelated, the test statistic has a chi-square distribution with one degree of
freedom. To avoid serial correlation problems, we focus on the results for Q1. Even with
individual bias adjustment, the result from the uniform-within-bin conﬁdence bands is
that the null hypothesis of correct coverage can be rejected (using a 5% critical value) for
22% of the forecasters. If we focus on forecasters with 5 or more replies (to increase the
power of the test), the null hypothesis can be rejected for 34% of the forecasters. The
corresponding numbers for the ﬁtted normal distributions are 28% and 38% respectively.
These results are in line with those found by Giordani and S¨ oderlind (2003) for inﬂa-
tion forecasts from the SPF (in that case the sample was 1969-2001). In fact, the ﬁnding
of undersized conﬁdence bands is a typical result in the behavioral literature (see, for
example, Hirshleifer (2001), Rabin (1998), and Thaler (2000)).
To see the importance for asset pricing, consider the results for the ﬁtted normal dis-
tributions at the 90% conﬁdence level. To get an actual coverage of 68% as in Table 2,
the investors must have believed in a variance which is approximately a third of the actual
(ex post) variance.7 In terms of the asset pricing equation (1) this gives overconﬁdence
instead of doubt: θ is negative and equal to −(2/3)σ2. Combining this number with
the ﬁnding in Table 1 of a 0.7% pessimism (at most), our “empirical version” of (1) is
7For instance, the probability of x ≤ −0.95 is 5% according to a N(0,1/3) distribution and 17%
according to a N(0,1) distribution.
10therefore
lnE(Rc/Rr) = γσ2/3 + 0.007. (2)
Although the pessimism contributes somewhat to explaining the equity premium puzzle,
the overconﬁdence works strongly in the opposite direction. For instance, suppose the
equity premium is 5.7%. Without pessimism and doubt (set 1 = θ = 0 in (1)), γσ2 must
then be 5.7%—which is a challenge since it requires very high risk aversion and/or very
high consumption uncertainty. With the pessimism and overconﬁdence documented here,
γσ2 must instead be 15%—which is an even bigger challenge.
Of course, this discussion should not be taken literally since the stock market index is
not a claim on the consumption process—but the main point is that the joint evidence of
pessimism and overconﬁdence seems to worsen the equity premium puzzle. That conclu-
sion may be premature, however. One factor complicating the analysis is disagreement
among forecasters, which we discuss in the next section.
6 Disagreement and Aggregation of Beliefs
This section incorporates heterogeneous beliefs in the study of pessimism and doubt. The
statistics reported in Table 2 add to the existing stock of evidence of overconﬁdence in
individualdistributions. DoesthisimplythatwemustruleoutdoubtinAbel’smodel? Not
necessarily. Abel’s ﬁctitious agents have identical subjective distributions by assumption.
Our real forecasters do not, and mapping heterogeneous beliefs into the distribution of
a representative agent is not a straightforward exercise. This section suggests a simple
approach to take the heterogeneity into account and provides further empirical evidence.
Varian (1985) studies the pricing of Arrow-Debreu assets when opinions differ. The
















Ci2(s) = Yi2(s) + Bi(s) for all s. (3)
11In these equations, Ci1 and Ci2 (Yi1 and Yi2) are consumption (income) of individual i in
periods 1 and 2. The values in period 2 are uncertain, since it is not known in which “state
of the world” (indexed by s) we will end up. The assets (one for each state) are indexed
by s, p(s) denoting the price of an asset which delivers one unit in state s, and Bi(s)
the amount of asset s purchased by individual i. The expectations operator, Ei, carries
a subscript to indicate that the investors have different beliefs (otherwise all investors
are identical). The second equation says that period-one income (of individual i) equals
consumption and the net purchase of assets. The third equation says that period-two
consumption in state s (of individual i) equals income (in that state) plus the number of
asset s held.
Given the amount of public attention/debate on macro forecasting, we think that the
individual histograms in the SPF should be thought of as representing beliefs “at and
after trading.” The forecasters probably arrived at those beliefs by incorporating prior be-
liefs/information and then updating them with public information (as revealed by media,
other forecasts, and the trading process)—but the beliefs did not converge: it is probably
fair to say that most macro forecasters have very similar information sets, but still arrive
at different forecasts.
We wish to derive the price of a real bond which delivers one unit in all states in pe-
riod 2, and the price of a claim on consumption which delivers the average (per capita)
consumption (equal to average income) in period two. We assume that individual dis-
tributions of the (gross) growth rate of aggregate consumption are lognormal (following
Abel), and that the investors differ only with respect to the means (point forecasts) of their
distributions. In particular, we assume that the cross-sectional (across investors) distribu-
tion of the individual point forecasts is normal. In reality, the forecasters in SPF disagree
also on the volatility (and other moments of data), but to a smaller extent.
To derive the asset prices, we have to ﬁnd the equilibrium allocation. The simplest
case is when the utility function is logarithmic (γ = 1). Then, all investors will choose
the same consumption level in period 1, so aggregation is straightforward (see Rubinstein
(1974) and also Detemple and Murthy (1994) for a more recent application). Appendix B
shows that the price of a consumption claim (Pc) relative to the price of a real bond (Pr)
then is
ln(Pc/Pr) = µ − (σ2 + δ2)/2, (4)
where µ is the mean (across individuals) growth rate of average consumption, σ2 is
12the variance of individual distributions of consumption growth, and δ2 is the variance
(dispersion/disagreement) of individual point forecasts. The relative asset price in this
heterogeneous-agent economy is the same of a representative-agent economy in which
the distribution of the representative agent’s beliefs is described by a normal distribution
with mean µ, the average mean across agents, and variance σ2+δ2, the average individual
uncertainty plus a measure of disagreement. This is the distribution we get by averaging
individual probabilities.
This suggests that it makes sense to assess pessimism by comparing the average (or
median) point forecasts with the outcome—as we did in Section 4. It also suggests that
we should take disagreement into account when constructing the conﬁdence bands.
When the utility functions are not logarithmic, we arrive at approximate results only—
since the investors now differ in their choice of period 1 consumption. However, Ap-
pendix B shows that the kind of disagreement found in the SPF means that a very good
approximation is given by
ln(Pc/Pr) ≈ µ + (1 − 2γ)(σ2 + δ2/γ)/2. (5)
Thedifferencebetweenthelogutilitycase(4)isthatdisagreement(δ2)becomesrelatively
less important compared to the individual uncertainty (σ2) when γ is large. Although
disagreement does contribute to the risk premium, its role is much smaller than that of
the individual uncertainty. The intuition is that the risk individual investors perceive (and
which will be priced) is their own uncertainty. The important empirical implication is that
the log utility case provides an upper bound (if we rule out γ < 1) of the relative error we
make by forgetting disagreement.
We therefore construct conﬁdence bands by averaging the probabilities of individual
forecasters—as an upper bound on the importance of disagreement. Because the amount
of disagreement is non-negligible (on average, δ2 makes up a third of σ2 + δ2 for the
4-quarter horizon), the coverage ratios from the average probabilities, reported in Table 3,
are higher than those found for individual forecasters (see Table 2)—they are (with bias
adjustment) fairly close to their nominal values. We also ﬁnd that the average probabil-
ities (with bias adjustment) have no problem passing the Christoffersen’s test of correct
coverage (the p-values are much higher than 5%).
However, there is still no evidence of doubt—and (as argued above) this should be
considered as an upper bound on the importance of disagreement.
13Fitted normal Histograms, assuming
distributions ﬂat pdf within bin
Conﬁdence level: 90% 80% 66% 90% 80% 66%
No bias adjustment 0.76 0.62 0.48 0.89 0.74 0.55
Bias adjustment 0.87 0.73 0.59 0.91 0.83 0.61
Table 3: Comparison of conﬁdence bands and actual GDP growth, average probabilities.
This table shows the fraction of forecasts when actual GDP growth is inside the respective x%
conﬁdence band. Conﬁdence bands are from the average (across forecasters) probabilities of each
interval. The bias adjusted conﬁdence bands are formed by adjusting the mean by the average bias
(different values for Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4). The sample is 1982Q1–2002Q4, excluding 1985Q1
and 1986Q1.
7 Summary
Pessimism and doubt in the subjective probability distributions of consumption and in-
come growth can improve the empirical performance of standard asset pricing models.
Using expectations from the Survey of Professional Forecasters and from the Livingston
Survey, we are able to study pessimism and doubt in subjective distributions of real fore-
casters. There is some evidence of pessimism in our data, but individual forecasters
clearly exhibit overconﬁdence rather than doubt. However, building on a simple model
we argue that doubt may be more appropriately measured with reference to the aggregate
(averaged across individuals) probability distribution. The average distribution shows no
statistically signiﬁcant sign of either overconﬁdence or doubt.
Our conclusion is therefore that doubt is not a promising explanation of the equity
premium puzzle, and that the amount of pessimism we document provides only a rather
small improvement in the empirical performance of the model. This conclusion must be
considered tentative, however, for at least two reasons. The ﬁrst is that results may differ
if we could use data on consumption or dividend growth. The second is that there is
no guarantee that the beliefs of professional forecasters (as opposed to say, those of the
general public or of professional traders) are the most relevant for asset pricing.
14A Derivation of Equation (1)
The consumption claim has the price Pct = Ctβ exp[(1 − γ)µ∗ + (1 − γ)2σ∗2/2], and
the real bond has the price Prt = β exp(−γµ∗ + γ 2σ∗2/2).
The true expectation of the return on the consumption claim is therefore E Rc =
ECt+1/PCt = exp(µ + σ2/2)/{β exp[(1 − γ)µ∗ + (1 − γ)2σ∗2/2]}, where µ and σ2
are the true moments. For the one-period real bond we have Rr = 1/Pr = exp(γµ∗ −
γ 2σ∗2/2)/β.
The average realized excess return, E(Rc/Rr), follows directly as E(Rc/Rr) =
exp(µ − µ∗ + σ2/2 − (1 − 2γ)σ∗2/2). This simpliﬁes to equation (1).
B Derivation of Equation (5)
B.1 First Order Conditions and Results for Log Utility
We assume that all investors are identical, except that they have different beliefs. The
optimization problem is as in (3). Investor m’s ﬁrst order condition for AD asset s can be
written
p(s)1/γ Cm2 (s) = β1/γ fm(s)1/γCm1,
where fm(s) is investor m’s subjective pdf evaluated at s (if the number of states is ﬁ-
nite, fm(s) is the probability assigned to state s) . To simplify the notation slightly, we
henceforth assume that β = 1 and that the aggregate output in state s equals s, that is,
Y2(s) = s.








Use the market clearing condition that in state s output equals aggregate consumption
(output), s =
R







Most of the terms in parenthesis are parameters (exogenous): the aggregate output in
period 1, the states, the subjective distributions and the distribution of the investors. How-
ever, the consumption choice in period 1 of agent m, Cm1, must be determined in equi-
librium. For the case of γ = 1 (log utility), it is established (see Rubinstein (1974)) that






fm(s)gmdm, if γ = 1.
In this case, it is the average (across investors) probabilities that matter for asset pricing.
15B.2 Numerical Results on Period 1 Consumption for γ 6= 1
To get results for γ 6= 1, we assume that fm(s) is lognormal so investor m’s beliefs about
lnY2 is N(m,σ2). We also assume that investors only differ with respect to the mean
of their subjective distributions, and that those means are normally distributed: gm is the
pdf of N(µ,δ2). These assumptions have the advantages of being consistent with the













Figure 3: Period 1 consumption relative to the median investor, Cm1/Cµ1, as a function of the
mean of the individual distribution (average mean 2%).
To ﬁnd the equilibrium values of Cm1, we use a numerical routine. The lognormal
distributions of investors are approximated by discrete distributions with 35 points, and
the normal distribution across investors is approximated by a discrete distribution with 21
points. We calculate results for the following values which square well with the SPF data:
median expected growth rate (µ) of 2%, cross-sectional standard deviation of means (δ)
of 1%, and individual standard deviations (σ) of 1%.
The main results are illustrated in Figure 3. For γ > 1, investors with non-typical
means consume more in period 1—and the pattern is such that ln(Cm1/Cµ1) is very well
approximated by ρ(m − µ)2, where ρ is positive. The numerical calculations verify that
Cm1/Cµ1 = 1 for γ = 1, and also show that γ < 1 gives the reverse pattern compared to
γ > 1.
The main point of the simulations, however, is that period 1 consumption does not
differ very much between investors—so we could approximate (7) by setting Cm1 to a
constant. A more formal argument is as follows. Consider Cm1gm in (7), where gm is a
normal pdf φ(m;µ,δ2). Multiplying this pdf by exp[ρ(m − µ)2] gives φ(m;µ,δ2
ρ)δp/δ
where δρ = δ/(1 − 2ρδ2)1/2. This shows that Cm1gm is also a normal pdf (times the
16factor δp/δ), with a higher standard deviation than gm. However, the difference is small.
Keeping the other parameters constant, we have δ = 0.01 and the numerical results in
Figure 3 (for γ = 5) give ρ = 250, so δp ≈ 1.025 × δ.
To make Cm1 really differ between investors, we would need to make the cross-
sectional variation (δ) several times larger than the individual uncertainty (σ). This is
certainly not the case in SPF, so we believe that setting Cm1 = Y1 provides a good ap-
proximation.
B.3 Approximate Asset Pricing Results for γ 6= 1
We now assume that Cm1 = Y1 for all investors to arrive at simple approximate results.
The following remarks turn out to be useful for calculating (7). (Proving the remarks
involves straightforward calculations).
Remark 1 Let ϕ(s;m,σ2) be a lognormal pdf where Elns = m and Var(lns) = σ2.
Raising the lognormal pdf to the power of α gives
ϕ(s;m,σ2)α = (2πσ2)(1−α)/2α−1/2s1−αϕ(s;m,σ2/α).




ϕ(s;m,σ2)φ(m;µ,δ2)dm = ϕ(s;µ,σ2 + δ2).
Remark 3 By combining the two previous remarks, we have
Z
m
ϕ(s;m,σ2)αφ(m;µ,δ2)dm = (2πσ2)(1−α)/2α−1/2s1−αϕ(s;µ,σ2/α + δ2),









To ﬁnd p(s) in (7), note that the term in parenthesis can be calculated by applying







γσ)γ−1(γσ2 + δ2)(1−γ)/2ϕ(s;µ,σ2 + δ2/γ). (8)






γσ)γ−1(γσ2 + δ2)(1−γ)/2e(1−γ)µ+(1−γ)2(σ2+δ2/γ)/2, (9)
17which uses the standard formula E yk = exp(kµ + k2σ2/2).





γσ)γ−1(γσ2 + δ2)(1−γ)/2e−γµ+γ 2(σ2+δ2/γ)/2. (10)
We ﬁnally relate the prices of the two assets to get (5).
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